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BUILDING MARITIME SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Outsiders Not Welcome?
Major Victor Huang, Republic of Singapore Navy
Today’s globalized economy is intricately interconnected and is heavily de-pendent on maritime trade in order to sustain the movement of energy, raw
materials, and finished goods. The arteries of global trade include the narrow
waterways of Southeast Asia, with about a third of the world’s trade and half its
oil transiting through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore alone.1 As China and
India continue their strong growth, sea trade through the straits is expected to
increase correspondingly.2 Major economies such as the United States, China,
Japan, and India all have stakes in ensuring the safe passage of shipping through
the region. The littoral states of Southeast Asia may be the most concerned of all;
any interruption in shipping would heavily impact their economies by disrupt-
ing port operations and the smooth flow of raw materials and finished products.
Armed robbery at sea is a persistent problem in the area, and maritime
hijackings and kidnappings continue to occur.3 There are fears that the straits
could become a target for terrorism and a haven for illegal trafficking of people
and weapons.4 Many states are interested in the strengthening of maritime secu-
rity in Southeast Asia in order to protect their trade
and prevent illegal activity.
While the littoral states have recently overcome his-
torical mistrust sufficiently to engage in basic mari-
time cooperation, the efforts of extraregional players
to introduce security frameworks from without have
been met with ambivalence or outright rejection. For
example, the Regional Maritime Security Initiative
(RMSI), proposed by the United States, was strongly
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criticized after the media incorrectly reported that U.S. high-speed vessels
would conduct antiterrorist patrols in the Strait of Malacca;5 similarly, the Pro-
liferation Security Initiative (PSI) continues to be viewed with suspicion.6 Resis-
tance to the establishment of security frameworks can arise from outside
Southeast Asia as well. In 1999, a proposal of the Japanese prime minister, Keizo
Obuchi, that a regional coast guard be created as an antipiracy measure was
strongly opposed by China.7
The resulting absence of extraregional states in operational maritime security
initiatives is depriving the region of important resources and capabilities such as
information sharing and responsive multinational decision making, which are
especially important in view of the multinational nature of maritime trade.8 The
rejection of outside help by the littoral states is puzzling, since its presence
would contribute to the shared goal of improving overall security. Are outsiders
simply not welcome in Southeast Asian maritime security cooperation?
This article argues that effective maritime security cooperation in Southeast
Asia can be achieved only under a neutral multinational framework. The effort
must be largely led and implemented by the littoral states themselves, in order to
avoid power rivalries. At the operational level, effective cooperation can be
achieved through information sharing and operational coordination among
states.9 However, the conduct of patrols and enforcement actions within a litto-
ral state’s territorial seas must remain the responsibility of that state, in order to
protect coastal state sovereignty.
To date, effective operational cooperation has been achieved only under re-
gional agreements that are limited in scope and goals, whereas extraregional ef-
forts have been hobbled by politics. By studying these efforts as case studies and
recognizing the issues that inhibit or facilitate regional cooperation, extra-
regional states can devise strategies to increase their participation in regional se-
curity cooperation and apply lessons to promote such international frameworks
as PSI and the “thousand-ship navy.”
This article evaluates how the willingness of the littoral states to cooperate
varies according to differing threat perceptions, concern over sovereignty, and a
desire for geostrategic nonalignment. It surveys recent attempts at maritime co-
operation and analyzes the factors for success or failure. Finally, the article dis-
cusses how extraregional players could contribute toward meaningful maritime
security cooperation without causing affront to regional sensitivities.
THE LITTORAL STATES
We begin by examining the littoral states that border the Malacca and Singapore
straits (see map), which are the waterways in the region that have attracted the
greatest attention.
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Singapore
The city-state of Singapore is heavily dependent on maritime trade to fuel its export-
driven economy and its hub status in the transshipment trade and in oil refining.
Among the three littoral states, Singapore’s economy would be most severely af-
fected by a disruption in the free flow of shipping through the region. Singapore also
keenly feels the threat of maritime terrorism. First, its advanced infrastructure—
including its container port, its petrochemical refineries, and the city itself—would
suffer the greatest economic damage from a terrorist attack. Second, its city center
and critical industries are situated on its southern coast adjacent to the busy Sin-
gapore Strait, exposed to possible maritime attack with minimal time and space
for reaction should one of the vessels in the busy waterways have hostile intent.
This heightens Singapore’s desire for advance warning through information
sharing. Third, Singapore is an ideologically attractive target because of its close
links with Western states, which offend radical religious fundamentalists.10 This
threat environment has heightened Singapore’s sense of vulnerability; Teo Chee
Hean, Singapore’s minister for defense, has consistently maintained that mari-
time terrorism remains “a clear and present danger.”11 A recent article in Pointer,
the official journal of the Singapore Armed Forces, reasoned that terrorist orga-
nizations have the “capability, intent and opportunity” to conduct a maritime
attack.12 Singapore is eager to enhance further international and interagency co-
operation in order to defend against the threat of maritime terrorism.
Recognizing the importance of maritime security, Singapore has built a mod-
ern and capable navy and police coast guard that effectively protect the
sixty-mile-long Singapore Strait. In 2003, Singapore established the interagency
Maritime and Port Security Working Group, which brings together the navy,
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police coast guard, and the maritime and port authority. The group imple-
mented regulatory measures to improve port security and control the move-
ment of shipping within the port.13 Singapore also monitors the vessels that pass
through the Singapore Strait, via its vessel traffic information system.14 This sys-
tem uses coastal radars to track up to five thousand vessels; it is integrated with
electronic navigational chart displays and synchronized voice, track, and data
recording, allowing historical and real-time traffic analyses.15 Within the region,
Singapore is one of the most vocal advocates of international cooperation;16 it
enjoys close ties with regional countries, as well as with the United States, China,
and Japan.17
Malaysia
Like Singapore, Malaysia is dependent on maritime trade. Eighty percent of its
trade passes through the Strait of Malacca, and major Malaysian ports are situ-
ated on the strait itself. Malaysia is also concerned with protecting its fishing and
tourism industries, which would be adversely affected by collisions and
groundings and any oil spills that might result. Accordingly, Malaysia is focused
on ensuring navigational safety and protecting against environmental threats, in
addition to countering piracy.18 Previously, Malaysian policy makers had
downplayed the threat of maritime terrorism and argued that no proof existed
of a “concrete nexus” between piracy and terrorism.19 Recently, however, Malay-
sia has warned of the possibility of terrorist attacks using hijacked ships, includ-
ing those carrying dangerous materials. In June 2007, Malaysia’s top police
official stated that maritime terrorism was a “real and possible” threat that could
“devastate Southeast Asia’s economic environment and severely disrupt trade.”20
The Malaysian deputy prime minister, Najib Razak, has called for greater vigi-
lance and intelligence sharing to combat piracy and prevent terrorism along the
Malacca Strait.21
To improve its effectiveness at policing its own waters, Malaysia took the ma-
jor step of reorganizing its five maritime agencies to form the Malaysian Mari-
time Enforcement Agency, which was established in May 2004 and officially
launched in March 2006. The agency will buy new vessels, refurbish many of its
seventy-plus existing craft, and acquire six helicopters for surveillance, enforce-
ment, and search-and-rescue duties.22
Malaysia contends that the littoral states themselves have the capacity to safe-
guard the straits. Nonetheless, the Malaysians “find it difficult to accept that
while international users consider the straits as an international sea lane which
they have the right to use,” the effort and heavy financial cost of securing the
straits and ensuring navigational safety are regarded as the responsibilities of the
littoral states.23 Therefore, “modalities for burden sharing” should be explored.24
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This will become more important in the future, as traffic volumes are expected
to increase. Malaysia is wary, however, of “internationalization” of the straits,
which would impinge upon regional security interests.25
Indonesia
Indonesia has a smaller economic stake than Singapore or Malaysia in the safety
of the Malacca and Singapore straits, because the majority of its trade is con-
ducted through the Lombok and Sunda straits.26 Indonesia’s attention is more
focused on such domestic issues as economic development, political reform, ter-
ritorial integrity, and militant Islamism.27 For the Indonesian navy, countering
piracy may also be less important than patrolling its extensive maritime borders;
handling maritime border disputes; and countering smuggling, illegal fishing,
and environmental degradation.28 Indonesians are particularly sensitive to bor-
der disputes after the painful experience of losing two small islands off eastern
Borneo, Sipadan and Ligitan, to Malaysia as the result of an International Court
of Justice decision in 2002.29 The adjoining oil-rich Ambalat region of the
Celebes Sea is still disputed;30 it is highly valued by Indonesia, which sent seven
warships and four F-16s there in March 2005 after alleged incursions by Malay-
sian warships and aircraft.31
In addition, Indonesia’s enforcement capacity is stretched by lack of funding
and poor maintenance of its ships. According to the Indonesian defense minis-
ter, Juwono Sudarsono, only 60 percent of Indonesia’s fleet of 124 ships is opera-
tional;32 in contrast, the chief of staff of the Indonesian navy, Admiral Slamet
Soebijanto, estimates that at least 302 ships and 170 aircraft are required to pro-
tect the nation’s archipelago of seventeen thousand islands.33 Although Indone-
sia is acquiring new patrol boats, it has asked the United States for military
assistance in the form of training and support in order to build its enforcement
capacity.34 Indonesia has stressed, however, that foreign military presence is out
of the question.
Indonesia’s incentive to protect the straits is to demonstrate sovereignty over its
waters, while promoting good international relations, especially since it receives
security assistance and counterterrorism funding from the United States and Aus-
tralia and aid from Japan.35 Indonesia has also promoted cooperation between the
littoral states;36 held biannual coordinated patrols with India since September
2002;37 and signed agreements with Australia, Japan, and India to increase co-
operation in security matters, including maritime security. Indonesia also ex-
panded its defense interactions with the United States after the restoration of U.S.
international military education and training (IMET), and operational ex-
changes, such as the annual “Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training”
(CARAT) exercises, were broadened to build understanding and interoperability
H U A N G 9 1
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further. For example, the sea phase of exercise CARAT was lengthened to five days
in July 2006, more than double the length of the previous year’s exercise.
ATTEMPTS AT REGIME BUILDING
There have been several efforts to involve the littoral states in maritime coopera-
tion. These efforts can be split into two types: top-down frameworks proposed
by extraregional stakeholders, and bottom-up efforts agreed among the littoral
states themselves. These efforts are aimed at shaping the regional maritime secu-
rity environment, and some states hope that they will result in regional mari-
time regimes favorable to their interests.
An international regime implies “regulated patterns of practice on which
expectations converge [that] govern state behavior in specific areas of inter-
national relations.”38 There are many maritime regimes that cover the rights of
states in the protection of shipping, fishing, marine resources, and other areas.
The most comprehensive and important maritime regime today is the UN Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In the Malacca and Singapore straits,
all three littoral states are party to UNCLOS, which specifies the rights and obli-
gations of international-strait states in their territorial seas versus the right to
transit passage of foreign states.
The idea of a maritime regime is an appealing one. Since the regional states
have a common interest in enhancing maritime security, it would be in the na-
tional interest of each of them to participate.39 In 1991, Michael Leifer, for exam-
ple, envisaged a stable and peaceful maritime regime in East Asia whereby states
could pursue their interests and manage their resources in accordance with the
principles of international law and without the risk of conflict.40 While many
conferences have been held to improve understanding and build confidence, the
region’s states have been reluctant to move beyond the status quo.41 Neverthe-
less, the ideal of building a maritime security regime has remained attractive to
the present day, especially for the stakeholders with the most to gain, such as the
United States, Japan, and Singapore. The U.S. National Strategy for Maritime Se-
curity, published in 2005, states that “regional maritime security regimes are a
major international component of this Strategy and are essential for ensuring
the effective security of regional seas.”42 Let us now survey several initiatives
aimed at maritime security regime building, beginning with those initiated by
extraregional stakeholders and aimed at direct operational cooperation.
Top-Down Frameworks
Southeast Asia is a region of not only many diverse states but also of overlapping
spheres of influence between rival extraregional powers. Attempts by one to
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introduce a security regime have been rebuffed by others who perceive them as
upsetting the regional balance.
Japan’s Ocean Peacekeeping Force concept is an example of an initiative by an
extraregional power that was stifled.43 Throughout the 1990s, Japan tried to in-
crease regional cooperation and enhance security by providing much-needed
training and assistance to the littoral states. Building upon these efforts, Prime
Minister Keizo Obuchi formally proposed, at the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) Plus Three (Japan, South Korea, and China) summit in 1999,
the formation of a regional coast guard to combat piracy. It was to be based on
multilateral patrols by forces from Japan, South Korea, China, Malaysia, Indone-
sia, and Singapore. The proposal was immediately and strongly opposed by
China, which saw in it a Japanese move to extend its security role in East Asia and
contain Chinese maritime influence.44 Subsequent Japanese-proposed initia-
tives, like the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and
Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), have been much less ambitious
in scope, covering only voluntary information submission, and funded by vol-
untary contributions. This episode suggests that, in general, attempts by
extraregional powers to exert leadership are likely to trigger unfavorable reac-
tions from rivals. Since the littoral states can ill afford to offend any of the
extraregional powers, externally led efforts at leading change are unlikely to
meet with success.
Another difficulty faced by externally led efforts is that they may raise sover-
eignty concerns. This was the situation faced by the Regional Maritime Security
Initiative, a conceptual framework proposed by the United States in 2004 for
neutral, multilateral maritime security cooperation. RMSI was intended to be a
voluntary partnership of regional states to share information and provide
cueing (early warning) to counter transnational threats.45 Unfortunately, the
media incorrectly reported that Admiral Thomas Fargo, Commander, U.S. Pa-
cific Command (USPACOM), had testified to Congress on 31 March of that year
that American Special Forces and Marines would patrol the Malacca Strait in
high-speed vessels.46 Although this was untrue, RMSI was permanently tainted
by this misunderstanding, even in academic papers.47 RMSI was immediately
blasted by the leaders of Malaysia and Indonesia, who condemned the proposed
deployment of U.S. forces in the strait as a direct affront to their sovereignty.48
(While Chinese analysts wondered whether RMSI was designed to contain
China, Chinese officials said little and seemed content to stand aside in this dip-
lomatic fracas.)49 As a result of widespread condemnation, USPACOM allowed
the RMSI concept to wither away, and “RMSI” vanished from the command’s
official communications in 2005.50
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Even when considered under its true spirit, RMSI would likely not have suc-
ceeded. While Admiral Fargo pitched it as a voluntary partnership of the willing, it
appeared that the United States would take a leadership role in concept develop-
ment and implementation. That would have raised fears that it sought to assume
the initiative in the region, especially in light of the U.S. history of hub-and-spoke
military diplomacy (notably in the organization of the Iraq invasion of 2003).
This would surely have provoked the ire of China and other powers. As it hap-
pened, no objections were raised, because the issue of U.S. forces stationed in the
Malacca Strait proved much more sensitive, and sovereignty concerns in that con-
nection provided a convenient diplomatic “out” for the rejection of RMSI. China
was wise to keep silent, because its concerns over American leadership would have
seemed insensitive next to the more important issue of sovereignty.
Concern about international law and U.S. leadership was also evident in the
region’s response to the Proliferation Security Initiative. The PSI is a U.S.-led
global initiative to prevent traffic of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). PSI
requires the political cooperation of many other countries to succeed; flag-state
permission is often necessary for interdiction at sea. PSI is an interesting test
case for the region, because it has the appearance of a top-down framework de-
signed to achieve the common goal of nonproliferation, and the obligations of
PSI “participants” (as opposed to “members”) are recommendatory and legally
nonbinding. To emphasize this, PSI is deliberately marketed as an “activity” and
not an “organization.” Although PSI participants have declared that they are
committed to certain principles to impede and stop shipments of WMD, includ-
ing searching in their waters vessels “reasonably suspected” of carrying such car-
goes, they are not obliged to take part in any specific activities that they oppose.
Also, they need only “seriously consider” providing consent for their vessels and
aircraft to be searched when suspected of carrying WMD. All in all, PSI could be
seen as an effort to facilitate operational cooperation and by which participants
can signal political support for nonproliferation. It attempts to promote multi-
lateral cooperation without a cumbersome treaty apparatus.51 In addition, the
spirit of PSI was emphatically affirmed by the passage on 28 April 2004 of UN
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, requiring all states to take mea-
sures to prevent proliferation.52
Nonetheless, participation in PSI by Asian states was initially very low. Only
Japan and Singapore expressed early public support and formally signed on.
Other states might have refrained from participating because of concern about
its “ad hoc, extra–United Nations, U.S.-driven nature.”53 In September 2004, the
Malaysian prime minister, Abdullah Badawi, declared to the UN General Assem-
bly that while Malaysia was committed to nonproliferation, there was a need for
multilateral negotiations for “universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory
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agreements and arrangements.”54 This statement reflects fears that American
leadership would be nonconsultative and unilateral, that implementation of PSI
would “constitute a major shift from negotiated multilateralism of the post-war
system to cooperative unilateralism under post–Cold War American hege-
mony.”55 There were also concerns that the United States would use the Prolifer-
ation Security Initiative in an inequitable manner against countries, such as Iran
and North Korea, that it designates as “rogue states.”56
Some countries cited concern over the legality of the initiative as well. Since
the U.S. national security strategy states that the United States will, if necessary,
act preemptively against WMD threats, some states are concerned that it would
use the PSI to conduct interdictions in ways that violate international law.57 In
September 2005 China declared that it would not join PSI due to concerns over
legality.58 In March 2006, Indonesia declined Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice’s request that Indonesia join the PSI.59 Subsequently, on 10 June 2006, the
Indonesian minister of defense, Juwono Sudarsono, wrote in the Jakarta Post
that Indonesia would not join PSI because it “contravenes provisions of
[UNCLOS].”60 He further explained in his official “weblog” that “it was impossi-
ble for Indonesia in strictly legal terms to accept the total package of the PSI, as it
endorsed interdiction of vessels passing through Indonesia’s territorial waters
[as] in the high seas.”61 In fact, PSI is intended to operate in a manner “consistent
with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks.”62
This example shows how concern over legality and neutrality can persist even
over an initiative that has been deliberately designed to be legal and neutral.
While the Proliferation Security Initiative has had some successes, until very
recently it appeared unable to make further inroads into Southeast Asia after its
rejection by China and Indonesia.6 3 American statements aimed at
depoliticizing PSI and emphasizing its multilateral, voluntary nature failed to
produce new participants in Asia willing to declare their support publicly. Para-
doxically, the passage of UNSCR 1540 in April 2004 made open participation in
PSI less politically attractive, in that the resolution requires states to conduct
counterproliferation. Participating in PSI would no longer signal support for
counterproliferation in general but support for U.S.-led operational coopera-
tion in particular. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that the founding
PSI members were the United States and other Western nations. Following an
apparent U.S. lead in an initiative supported by only two states within Asia was
something that most regional states, in particular Malaysia and Indonesia, were
unwilling to do, as it might have antagonized China.
Many states took the politically expedient option of being a “supporting”
country without making a “public statement of support,” as encouraged by the
United States.64 From 2003 to 2007, such states took part in PSI conferences but
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their identities were not known.65 This situation changed on 1 May 2007, when
the United States published a list of participants—eighty-two countries;66 this
was a staggering increase from the seventeen countries listed in September
2006.67 Within Southeast Asia, Brunei, Cambodia, Papua New Guinea, and the
Philippines are now listed by the United States as participants, although they
have not made public declarations of support.68 It remains to be seen whether
the large number of participants will confer an air of neutrality on PSI and pave
the way for the recruitment of more participants. Also, the commitment level of
these “revealed” PSI supporters remains in doubt in the absence of public state-
ments of support.
Several lessons can be drawn from these three attempts at regime building.
First, ambitious attempts at regime building by extraregional powers are un-
likely to succeed, because of major-power rivalries. This leads to inaction on the
part of regional states who wish to preserve their nonalignment. China’s eco-
nomic influence in the region and suspicion toward American and Japanese mo-
tives in particular will continue to deter smaller states from allowing any of the
major powers to play too great a role in regional regime building.
Second, offers of external operational assistance run up against sovereignty
concerns related to direct intervention by foreign powers. The littoral states do
not wish their waters patrolled by other countries, desiring to prevent major-
power rivalries and to retain tight control over their territorial seas. Some of this
reluctance can be attributed to enduring postcolonial nationalism and to popu-
lar antagonism toward the United States.69 Extraregional players should also
keep in mind that Indonesia, the world’s fourth-most-populous country, has
historically regarded itself as a regional power and remains fiercely nationalistic.
Third, there is evidence of a strong desire to preserve the status quo under ex-
isting international law and of resistance to new precedents that might compro-
mise future actions or negotiations. Thus, Indonesia has taken a “wait and see”
stance toward PSI since 2003; while it has declined to become a participant, it has
not ruled out partial adherence to PSI provisions on an ad hoc basis, thereby keep-
ing its diplomatic options open without compromising any of its interests.70
In summary, if a littoral state is to participate in a formal maritime security
regime, it must be prepared to give up some of its political freedom of action in
exchange for greater security. At present, the threats are not sufficiently compel-
ling, and the political costs, both foreign and domestic, are too great for Malaysia
and Indonesia to do so.
Bottom-Up Building Blocks
An alternative approach to deliberate regime building is to put in place mech-
anisms or even institutions to perform the tasks necessary for operational
N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W9 6
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cooperation. For example, coordinating patrols and sharing information are rela-
tively simple, unobjectionable actions that can be undertaken by the littoral
states among themselves. A long tradition of confidence building through bi-
lateral, coordinated antipiracy patrols, bilateral and multilateral exercises, and
personnel exchanges and interactions has built a firm foundation from which
the region might progress to noncoalition operational cooperation.71 An addi-
tional benefit of these relatively humble initiatives is that they tend to originate
within the region itself (an exception was ReCAAP, initiated by Japan).
The Malacca Straits Patrols was the first multilateral initiative to be imple-
mented in the region.72 It was deliberately designed to be modest, originating
from and limited to the three littoral states, and restricted in scope so as to avoid
sovereignty issues. The three littoral states, expanding on long-standing bilateral
coordinated patrols in order to enhance operational cooperation, launched tri-
lateral coordinated patrols on 20 July 2004.73 Since the sea patrols are coordi-
nated, not joint, each littoral state’s force patrols only within its own territorial
seas, with no right of pursuit across territorial sea boundaries; the states rely on a
hand-off mechanism to handle cross-boundary enforcement. Therefore, they
gained in operational effectiveness without the issues of legality that would arise
from intrusion into other states’ waters. A conceptually linked but officially un-
related boost to the initiative’s effectiveness was Project SURPIC, a technical sys-
tem that allows information sharing between Singapore and Indonesian
command and control (C2) centers in order to achieve a common operating pic-
ture in the Singapore Strait, facilitating communication and enforcement.
An “Eyes in the Sky” initiative to enhance surveillance by combined maritime
air patrols was launched by the littoral states and Thailand on 13 September
2005.74 Previously, each state had conducted air surveillance patrols only within
its own airspace. This new program allows combined air patrols across territo-
rial boundaries, allowing for better effectiveness in the narrow straits as well as
promoting operational cooperation. A foreign liaison on board each aircraft
controls actions over the waters of that officer’s state, assuaging concerns over
sovereignty and ensuring that states do not abuse the flights for other purposes,
such as intelligence gathering. The use of air assets, which have less psychologi-
cal “presence” than surface craft, also alleviates sensitivity about sovereignty.
Since the aircraft can conduct only surveillance, not enforcement—in fact, they
carry no weapons that could be used for enforcement purposes—there is no
possibility of one state enforcing laws in another state. Overall, such efforts as
these have no impact on foreign-power rivalries or international law, and they
demonstrate the ability of the littoral states to police their own waters and air-
space under initiatives limited in scope and purpose.
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Similarly, working under the principles of regional inclusiveness, neutrality,
and noninterference, Japan managed to refashion its Ocean Peacekeeping
(known as OPK) concept into the more conservative and ultimately successful
ReCAAP proposal made by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in 2001. ReCAAP
is a broadly based initiative, involving all the ASEAN nations plus Bangladesh,
China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Sri Lanka.75 ReCAAP, which came into
force on 4 September 2006, is “the first regional government-to-government
agreement to promote and enhance cooperation against piracy and armed rob-
bery at sea in Asia.”76 The operational heart of ReCAAP is its Information
Sharing Centre (ISC), located in Singapore, which reports and coordinates re-
sponses to incidents at sea. The member states also agree to cooperate in capac-
ity building, legal assistance, and extradition.
The establishment of ReCAAP was a breakthrough. It is an international insti-
tution to fight piracy, not merely a set of multilateral arrangements and exercises.
The inclusion of regional powers such as China, India, Japan, and South Korea
and the basing of the ISC in a littoral state have also given the initiative neutrality
and inclusiveness. Malaysia and Indonesia have not yet ratified the agreement,
though they are expected to do so.77 Their hesitation is attributed to concern over
the location of the ISC in Singapore;78 this concern, in turn, reflects rivalry among
the littoral states, as well as fear that the ISC would publish reports unfair to other
member states.79 This delay suggests that the neutrality of such initiatives is im-
portant not just among powers but also among the littoral states themselves.
On 27 March 2007, Singapore announced that it would construct a command
and control center to “house the Singapore Maritime Security Centre (SMSC),
an Information Fusion Centre (IFC), and a Multinational Operations and Exer-
cise Centre (MOEC).”80 The IFC will facilitate information fusion and sharing
among “participating militaries and agencies,” and the MOEC will provide the
infrastructure for multinational exercises, maritime security operations, and
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief should the need arise.81 In essence,
Singapore is offering a ready-made capability that can be leveraged for regional
cooperation at any time. This will allow a rapid operationalization of coopera-
tion initiatives should the political environment be conducive. Singapore’s ac-
tion could also reflect the hope that the existence of an additional C2 facility will
spur international cooperation. While it is still too early to see the impact of Singa-
pore’s announcement, Singapore’s command and control center looks to be an im-
portant seed crystal for future cooperation when it becomes operational in 2009.
TOWARD WIN-WIN SOLUTIONS
When it comes to maritime security cooperation in Southeast Asia, are outsiders
not welcome? The evidence shows that extraregional stakeholders are welcome
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in Southeast Asia. The littoral states appreciate the assistance of outside states—
but only within limits that are highly circumscribed and not politicized. The region
is unreceptive to regime building that sets off power rivalries and sovereignty
concerns. In contrast, the efforts of the littoral states themselves have been more
modest in scope, characterized by bottom-up cooperation that incrementally
builds operational cooperation.82 This cooperation has been facilitated by the
absence of an overarching framework, which would be political baggage.
ReCAAP, for its part, was successful only because it was seen by extraregional
powers as neutral and was limited to operational information sharing and
low-level, nonmilitary assistance.
Such experience suggests several options extraregional states could take to
strengthen regional maritime security. These are in line with the need for
multilateralism and neutrality. First, they can share ideas and build understand-
ing through multilateral forums. The annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore,
attended by defense ministers, has proved useful for exchanging viewpoints and
building understanding.83 The Western Pacific Naval Symposium is similarly
valuable at the operational level. Second, they can support intraregional initia-
tives. Support of such existing initiatives as ReCAAP would improve the pros-
pects for security. Although the United States is not a member of ReCAAP, it can
assist that effort by not establishing parallel or competing initiatives. Singa-
pore’s new C2 center is also a possible nexus for future multilateral cooperation.
Extraregional powers can promote confidence and increase interoperability
through exercises. Bilateral and multilateral exercises build the operational ex-
pertise of local navies, improving their abilities to secure the straits. Such exercises
also increase interoperability, which would facilitate future operational coopera-
tion should the opportunity arise. These exercises include CARAT and SEACAT
between the U.S. and Southeast Asian navies, and the Five Power Defence Ar-
rangements exercises among the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand,
Malaysia, and Singapore.* PSI exercises and discussions should continue to be
inclusive in order to build understanding of that initiative.
They can offer technical assistance to build capacity. Such help is welcome in
the region, especially by Indonesia.84 Outside assistance would render Indonesia,
with its limited budget and other priorities, better able to promote maritime se-
curity. Japan has installed navigational aids in the Malacca Strait and, through
the Nippon Foundation, donated a training ship to Malaysia in June 2006.85
While such assistance is not multilateral in nature, it takes place within normal
bilateral frameworks, and outside powers have not protested such interactions;
political sensitivities can also be somewhat lessened by rendering the assistance
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in low-key, behind-the-scenes ways. Goodwill can also be built through human-
itarian civic assistance. Political and operational payoffs accrued to the United
States, Japan, and other nations from the tsunami humanitarian relief mission
in northern Indonesia, and humanitarian civic assistance should be continued
in peacetime.86 Humanitarian aid does not directly strengthen regional mari-
time security, but it can promote mutual understanding and goodwill.
Finally, external powers can work through international organizations. New
international frameworks established through the UN and International Mari-
time Organization would be the most effective way of introducing new norms to
the region. Security Council resolutions are difficult to bring to adoption, but
the legal authority of such resolutions and the moral authority arising from such
focused expressions of international opinion make them highly effective. For ex-
ample, many of the goals of the Proliferation Security Initiative, as we have seen,
were achieved with the passage of UNSCR 1540. In this regard, ratification by
the United States of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea would increase
the legitimacy of that vehicle and facilitate the success of future initiatives.
There has been considerable progress in international understanding and co-
operation in Southeast Asia. The norms for acceptable participation by outside
actors in the region have become more clearly defined through the region’s ex-
perience with OPK, RMSI, PSI, and ReCAAP. Future cooperation initiatives can
thereby be tailored to avoid regional sensitivities. Although the main focus of
such initiatives has been the Malacca and Singapore straits, the inclusion of
Thailand in combined air patrols and the establishment of ReCAAP, involving
sixteen countries, suggest a potential to increase the geographical scope of re-
gional cooperation. Ultimately, extraregional players need to appreciate the dif-
fering needs and preferences of the littoral states and other extraregional powers
and to act accordingly to find a win-win solution for all parties.
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